Security
This is the security policy for Content Reuse Inventory for Confluence, a Forge app that scans the pages of a Confluence Cloud site and lists every Excerpt, MultiExcerpt and synced block with the pages that include it. It covers the first listed version and every later version published under the same app key, ua.pp.maxpetrov.content-reuse-inventory.
The app is written and maintained by one person, Max Petrov. There is no second office, no subcontractor and no sub-processor: the whole of it is the Forge app you install.
The app runs entirely inside Atlassian Forge, on Atlassian's own infrastructure, inside your tenant. Its manifest declares no permissions.external block, no remotes entry and no remote hostname, it opens no network connection of its own, it exposes no remote REST API and it registers no web trigger. It therefore has no internet-facing attack surface outside Atlassian, and no data of yours leaves Atlassian.
There is no vendor server to breach, no vendor database to leak and no vendor log to subpoena, because none of the three exists. Authentication is Forge's own; the app holds no credential, no API token and no secret of its own, and it asks you for none.
The inventory, in Forge app storage inside your site: page ids and space ids, the names and keys of the Excerpt, MultiExcerpt and synced-block nodes found in page bodies, the ids each include points at, space names, counts and scan metadata. No page body, no page title and no account id is stored. When a scan finishes, the previous scan's records are deleted; one inventory exists at a time.
Three scopes, each the narrowest one that does the job. Two are read-only; the third is the app's own storage. There is no write scope on any Confluence content.
read:page:confluence - reads page ids and atlas_doc_format bodies to find excerpt, MultiExcerpt and synced-block nodes; the same scope reads titles as the viewer so restricted pages stay hidden
read:space:confluence - resolves space ids to the space names shown in the Sources table and the per-space Counts, one GET /wiki/api/v2/spaces?ids= per scan; the grouping itself keys on spaceId, already on every v2 page object, and needs no scope — the scope buys names only (scope text "View space details"). Kept, because a table sold to admins that prints a numeric spaceId where a name belongs is I1's promise broken
storage:app - stores scan progress and the inventory in Forge hosted storage; nothing leaves Atlassian
Report a suspected vulnerability in this app to support@maxpetrov.pp.ua with the words SECURITY REPORT in the subject. Reports are acknowledged and triaged by the person who wrote the code.
The app runs entirely inside Atlassian Forge. Its manifest declares no permissions.external block and no remote hostname, it opens no network connection of its own, it exposes no remote REST API and it runs no web trigger — so it has no internet-facing attack surface outside Atlassian.
The app collects no Atlassian credential and no API token from anybody. It authenticates as the app through Forge and holds no secret of its own.
The app has no write scope on Confluence content. Its three scopes are two reads and its own Forge storage; there is no route in the code that edits, unsyncs or deletes a page.
Page titles never pass through the app's own read: the inventory holds ids and block names, and titles are fetched as the viewer through their own Confluence permissions, so a restricted page is counted and never revealed.
A fix for a confirmed vulnerability ships as a new Forge version; Forge apps on Atlassian cloud are upgraded by Atlassian, so there is no customer-side patch step.
Email support@maxpetrov.pp.ua with the words SECURITY REPORT in the subject. The report reaches the person who wrote the code; nobody else reads that mailbox.
One person reads that mailbox — the one who wrote the app — and every request gets a first reply within two business days, Monday to Friday. That is the window a part-time maintainer can hold every week rather than on a good one; most replies land sooner.
Please include the app version, the Confluence site you saw it on and the steps to reproduce. A confirmed vulnerability ships as a new Forge version; Atlassian upgrades Forge apps on Cloud itself, so there is no patch for you to install and no action for your administrators to take.
The privacy policy covers what the app does and does not process, and the documentation page covers how to use it. Both are linked from the app's Marketplace listing.