Security
This is the security policy for Large-Page Version Compare for Confluence, a Forge app that compares two versions of one Confluence page from the page's ••• menu. It covers the first listed version and every later version published under the same app key, ua.pp.maxpetrov.large-page-compare.
The app is written and maintained by one person, Max Petrov. There is no second office, no subcontractor and no sub-processor: the whole of it is the Forge app you install.
The app runs entirely inside Atlassian Forge, on Atlassian's own infrastructure. Its manifest declares no permissions.external block, no remotes entry and no remote hostname, and no backend function: the comparison is computed in the Confluence window. It therefore has no internet-facing attack surface outside Atlassian, and no data of yours leaves Atlassian.
There is no vendor server to breach, no vendor database to leak and no vendor log to subpoena, because none of the three exists. Authentication is Forge's own; the app holds no credential, no API token and no secret of its own, and it asks you for none.
Nothing, in this version. Both page versions are held in the open window and discarded when it closes. Forge app storage is declared so a later version could remember a pair of versions without a new permission prompt; no page body, no page title and no account id is written anywhere.
Two scopes, each the narrowest one that does the job: one read and the app's own storage. There is no write scope on any Confluence content.
read:page:confluence - reads the version list and two versions' atlas_doc_format bodies of the page the viewer opened, as the viewer
storage:app - declared so a later version can remember your last compared pair without a new permission grant; v1.0.0 writes nothing, and a guard test fails the build if any storage write is added
Report a suspected vulnerability in this app to support@maxpetrov.pp.ua with the words SECURITY REPORT in the subject. Reports are acknowledged and triaged by the person who wrote the code.
The app runs entirely inside Atlassian Forge. Its manifest declares no permissions.external block, no remotes entry and no remote hostname, and no backend function, web trigger or scheduled trigger — so it has no internet-facing attack surface outside Atlassian.
The app collects no Atlassian credential and no API token from anybody. It authenticates through Forge and holds no secret of its own.
The app has no write scope on Confluence content. Its two scopes are one read and its own Forge storage, which this version never writes; there is no route in the code that edits, restores or deletes a page.
Every read is made as the person using the app, from the Confluence window, through their own Confluence permissions, so the app can show only versions that person can already open. There is no read as the app.
A fix for a confirmed vulnerability ships as a new Forge version; Forge apps on Atlassian cloud are upgraded by Atlassian, so there is no customer-side patch step.
Email support@maxpetrov.pp.ua with the words SECURITY REPORT in the subject. The report reaches the person who wrote the code; nobody else reads that mailbox.
One person reads that mailbox — the one who wrote the app — and every request gets a first reply within two business days, Monday to Friday. That is the window a part-time maintainer can hold every week rather than on a good one; most replies land sooner.
Please include the app version, the Confluence site you saw it on and the steps to reproduce. A confirmed vulnerability ships as a new Forge version; Atlassian upgrades Forge apps on Cloud itself, so there is no patch for you to install and no action for your administrators to take.
The privacy policy covers what the app does and does not process, and the documentation page covers how to use it. Both are linked from the app's Marketplace listing.